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STARE DECISIS AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
REmAS oF LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.*
AssocATE JUsTicE (RETIRED)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
It is a privilege to give the inaugural Leslie H. Arps Lecture. I knew
Les fairly well as a young lawyer with Root, Clark, Buckner and Ballantine
in the 1930's. Les became an associate for that firm in 1931 upon his
graduation from the Harvard Law School. I took an LL.M. degree at the
Law School in 1932 and had a number of friends among the third year
students, including two who joined Les at Root, Clark on graduation-
Everett Willis and Frank Dewey. Everett and Frank shared an apartment
with Les in 1934, and when Frank married my sister Eleanor in Richmond,
Virginia, in August 1934, Les and Everett were ushers at the wedding.
One of the younger partners at Root, Clark at that time was John
Harlan. He did considerable work with Les and knew his abilities. In World
War II, on the recommendation of then Colonel W. Barton Leach of the
Harvard Law School, Harlan was selected to organize and head the Oper-
ation Research Section of the 8th Air Force, headquartered in England.
Harlan asked that Leslie Arps be appointed to his staff with the rank of
Major. At that time, Les had been drafted and was a sergeant in the Army.
The research of this Section was important for strategic Air Force
operations against Germany. I became Chief of Operational Intelligence on
General Spaatz's staff and was familiar with the work product of the
Section. John Harlan became a Colonel and Les Arps a Lieutenant Colonel.
Both were decorated.
Although I rarely saw Les after World War II, I knew that he was a
founding partner in the Skadden, Arps firm-a firm that has enjoyed
* Leslie H. Arps Lecture, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
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unprecedented growth both in terms of the firm's size and the quality and
importance of its practice.
The Skadden, Arps firm also has been a leader in emphasizing the duty
of lawyers and law firms to engage in pro bono activities, particularly the
providing of counsel for legal services programs for the poor.
In remarks that I made at the Georgetown University Law Center in
1988, I quoted Whitney North Seymour, Sr., a former president of this
Association, who, in his 1968 Cardozo Lecture, spoke of the duty of a
lawyer "to contribute at least some of his talents to the public good." I
have expressed the same view a number of times and have regretted the
emphasis on billable hours that now exists in many law firms.
The Skadden, Arps public service fellowship program may be unique
in its scope. My understanding is that the firm will fund up to fifty young
lawyers each year to work in offices that provide legal assistance to the
poor. This program is consistent with Les Arps' view of the duties of
lawyers. I hardly need add that throughout his career he was a quality
lawyer who represented clients, large and small, with great skill and fidelity.
I have read with approval the moving tributes paid to Les Arps at his
Memorial Service. I quote one sentence from what John D. Feerick said:
"The world is a better place for Les' having been here, and his departure
leaves us all feeling a great loss."
I turn now to the Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture. The subject
generally is stare decisis. I have a manuscript that will be available, but it
is a bit too long for oral delivery at an evening meeting.
I. STARE D.EcIsIs AND JuDIcIAL RESTRAINT
The beginning of October Term 1989 marks an appropriate occasion to
address again the subject of stare decisis. At the close of the 1988 Term,
commentators who agreed on little else unanimously proclaimed a "shift in
direction" on the Court. They described the 1988 Term as a watershed and
predicted reexamination of numerous areas of the law "previously thought
to be settled." You will not be surprised to learn that I take these
pronouncements, like many that have preceded them in past years, with a
grain of salt. In the era of "sound bites" and instant opinion polls, it is
dangerous to apply broad labels to a single Term of the Court. I emphasize
at the outset that in intellect and experience this is a strong Court.
The past Term presented an array of unusually difficult cases. This in
turn resulted not only in five to four decisions but in splintered rulings
without majority opinions. Unhappily, some opinions-on both sides of
issues-included language that in time the authors may regret. I was
concerned about the tone of some dissents when I was nominated for the
Court in 1971. But I was reassured when it became evident that what one
Justice may say about another's opinion rarely should be viewed as personal
criticism. I considered each of the Justices with whom I was privileged to
serve as a personal friend, as well as a lawyer whose qualifications to serve
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on the high Court I never questioned. Justice Kennedy also has high
qualifications.
A. Stare Decisis in the 1988 Term
Any talk of change at the Supreme Court prompts consideration of
stare decisis. Several of the Court's opinions in the past Term have contained
explicit discussions of stare decisis, both in statutory and constitutional
cases.
Perhaps the most significant of the statutory cases is Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,' in which the Court reconsidered the decision in
Runyon v. McCrar.)A that applied 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to private contracts.
The majority opinion did not hold that Runyon was correctly decided. But
the Court unanimously agreed that, regardless of its initial correctness,
Runyon should be reaffirmed on stare decisis grounds.3 Justice Kennedy's
Court opinion reviewed a number of the Court's past opinions and stated
that "the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule
of law. '
4
A constitutional case involving stare decisis was South Carolina v.
Gathers.5 In Gathers the Court was urged to reconsider Booth v. Maryland,6
an opinion I wrote for the Court in my last Term. Booth held that the
Eighth Amendment limits comment in capital sentencing proceedings on
attributes of a murder victim and his family that were unrelated to the
commission of a crime. Justice White, who had dissented in the Booth case,
declined to overrule it. He joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Gathers. The four dissenters in Gathers explicitly called for overruling
Booth. Justice Scalia discussed stare decisis at length. While he acknowl-
edged "some reservation concerning decisions that have become so embed-
ded in our system of government that return is no longer possible," he
argued that a Justice must be free to vote to overrule decisions that he or
she feels are not supported by the Constitution itself, as opposed to prior
precedents.
7
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
3. I joined the majority in Runyon for reasons largely attributable to stare decisis. As
I stated in my concurring opinion:
If the slate were clean I might well be inclined to agree with Ma. JusMcE WHE=
that § 1981 was not intended to restrict private contractual choices. Much of the
review of the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his dissenting opinion
is quite persuasive. It seems to me, however, that it comes too late.
The applicability of § 1981 to private contracts has been considered maturely and
recently, and I do not feel free to disregard these precedents.
Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
4. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989) (quoting Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
6. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
7. Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Of course, a new Justice is less bound by precedent in construing a
provision of the Constitution than a Justice who was sitting when a precedent
was decided. The Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,8 perhaps more controversial than the "flag burning" case,9 provides
an illustration. Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy declined to follow Roe
v. Wade&0 in that case. Justice Scalia would have overruled Roe explicitly.
Justice Kennedy joined the Chief Justice and Justice White in limiting Roe.
The end result was a badly fractured Court with five separate opinions. As
I joined Roe and wrote the Court opinion in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.,11 there is no secret as to how I would have voted
in Webster. I do not say this as a criticism of the Court. In its long history,
the presence on the Court of even a single new member often brings change.
B. Current Health of Stare Decisis
In light of the past term, it may be of interest to consider broadly the
current health of the principle of stare decisis. Some lawyers and academics
have suggested that the principle is now ignored or is at least in serious
decline.12 I cannot agree. I am reminded of Mark Twain's often quoted
cable from Europe to the Associated Press: "The reports of my death are
greatly exaggerated." In my view, Justice Stevens' 1983 assessment in his
New York University Law Review article 3 remains correct today. Overrulings
occur with some frequency, but when considered in light of the business of
the Court as a whole, they are rare. As Justice Stevens pointed out: "Two
or three overrulings each Term are, indeed, significant.' '14 But the Court,
in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, considers thousands of cases a year.
The vast majority involve nothing more than application of previously
decided cases. This is stare decisis.
A review of the Burger and Warren Courts illustrates my view of stare
decisis as a rule of stability, but not inflexibility. The Burger and Warren
Courts spanned a roughly equal number of years: Chief Justice Warren
presided for the sixteen-year period between 1953 and 1969; Chief Justice
Burger for seventeen years between 1969 and 1986. Counting the overruled
decisions of each era reveals that during Warren's tenure the Court overruled
sixty-three cases. The Burger Court, of which I was a member, overruled
some sixty-one cases. Of course, the precise numbers can vary depending
on the method of counting. I have chosen to rely primarily on explicit
overrulings. In any event, the point is plain. On a rough average, the Court
8. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
9. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467.
13. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1983).
14. Id. at 4.
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has overruled less than four cases per term. Thus, it has overruled a
significant and fairly constant number of prior decisions over time. But
when the totality of cases is considered, the general rule of stare decisis
remains a fundamental component of our judicial system.
Of course, the importance of cases overruled also is relevant. It can be
said fairly that the overruling of major decisions was infrequent under both
Chief Justices. I mention briefly some of the more celebrated overrulings
of the Warren and Burger Courts.
By far, the most important of the Warren Court cases is Brown v.
Board of Education.5 Brown explicitly overruled the 1899 case of Cumming
v. Board of Education,6 the 1927 case of Gong Lum v. Rice, 7 and, of
course, rejected Plessy v. Ferguson.8 The Warren Court overruled a number
of criminal procedure decisions in a series of cases that "incorporated" the
Bill of Rights through the fourteenth amendment.' 9 In its overall effect on
the structure of constitutional judicial review, the incorporation cases are
perhaps of unique significance. In other areas, Baker v. Carr02 overruled
Colegrove v. Green2' and brought legislative apportionment controversies
under judicial review. And Brandenburg v. Ohio22 overruled Whitney v.
California,23 finally making the "clear and present danger" standard the
law.
The Burger Court also had its share of important overrulings. In Miller
v. California24 the Court overruled the Memoirs caseu and established a
new standard for obscenity. In Gregg v. Georgia26 the Court overruled
McGautha v. California27 and began the present course of eighth amendment
scrutiny of capital punishment. Several cases broke new ground in expanding
the rights of women. For example, Taylor v. Louisiana2 invalidated res-
trictions on jury service by women, overruling a case decided in 1961 .29
And in Batson v. Kentucky, 0 an opinion I wrote in 1986, the Court overruled
Swain v. Alabama,J' easing the evidentiary burden of defendants who claim
racial discrimination in the jury selection process.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
17. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), and applying the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to state criminal trials).
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
23. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
24. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
25. Memoirs v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
28. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
30. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
31. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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C. Proper Role of Stare Decisis
The records of the Burger and Warren Courts are consistent with the
traditional role of stare decisis that I have described. For example, the
Burger Court demonstrated a greater sensitivity to the public interest in law
enforcement than that reflected in some of the decisions of the Warren
Court. Yet it did not overrule those Warren Court decisions, such as Mapp
v. Ohio,3 2 Massiah v. United States,33 and Miranda v. Arizona, 4 that
announced broad principles protecting the rights of criminal defendants.
Rather, the Burger Court, with due regard for stare decisis, set about the
difficult task of clarifying the scope of these sweeping decisions.35
Fortunately, there is no absolute rule against overruling prior decisions.
Brown itself stands as a testament to the fact that we have a living
Constitution. And where it becomes clear that a wrongly decided case does
damage to the coherence of the law, overruling is proper. But I repeat that
the general rule of adherence to prior decisions is a proper one. This is
true both for statutory and constitutional cases. Justice Frankfurter aptly
noted the critical importance of stare decisis when he described it as the
principle "by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court as
an institution transcending the moment can alone be brought to bear on
the difficult problems that confront us." '3 6 The specific merits of stare decisis
are familiar; I comment on them briefly.
(i) The first is one of special interest to judges: it makes our work
easier. As Justice Cardozo put it: "[The labor of judges would be increased
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in
every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." 37 Few
cases that reach the Supreme Court are easy. Most involve hours of study
and reflection; the conscientious judge must make many close calls. It
cannot be suggested seriously that every case brought to the Court should
require reexamination on the merits of every relevant precedent.
(ii) Stare decisis also enhances stability in the law. This is especially
important in cases involving property rights and commercial transactions.
Even in the area of personal rights, stare decisis is necessary to have a
predictable set of rules on which citizens may rely in shaping their behavior.
(iii) Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis
is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the public and
by the other branches of government rests in large part on the knowledge
that the Court is not composed of unelected judges free to write their policy
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. See Remarks of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A.B.A. Litigation Section Meeting (Aug. 12,
1986).
36. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
37. B. CARiozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcrAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
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views into law. Rather, the Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise
the judicial power prescribed by the Constitution. An important aspect of
this is the respect that the Court shows for its own previous opinions.
D. Recent Threats to Traditional Stare Decisis
Though the doctrine of stare decisis as I have described it remains
strong, challenges to the traditional conception of stare decisis have appeared
recently in two areas.
The first of these challenges concerns stare decisis in statutory cases.
The idea has long been advanced that stare decisis should operate with
special vigor in statutory cases because Congress has the power to pass new
legislation correcting any statutory decision by the Court that Congress
deems erroneous. Thus, if Congress fails to respond to a statutory decision,
the courts can assume that Congress believes that the statutory interpretation
was correct.
I am in general agreement with this view. But it can be taken to
extremes. Three Justices last Term joined with Justice Stevens in suggesting
that where a significant time has passed without action by Congress, the
Supreme Court's prior statutory decisions become as binding on the Supreme
Court itself as on lower courts. 8
In my view, the Court should hesitate to adopt such a categorical rule.
It reflects an unrealistic view of the political process and Congress' ability
to finetune statutes. Correction of erroneous statutory interpretations in
some cases may be vital to the effective administration of justice and the
coherence of the law. But correction may have little political constituency
in Congress. The Court, therefore, has a responsibility to ensure that its
statutory interpretations follow the intent of the drafting Congress as well
as to ensure that erroneous interpretations do not damage the fabric of the
law. Some statutes-I mention "RICO" 39-are a mishmash of ambiguities.
Indeed, some "statutory" law consists of an open-ended statute that has
been left almost entirely to "common law" development in the courts.
Federal antitrust law is an example.
A second recent challenge to traditional stare decisis is the renewal of
calls for a relaxation or even outright elimination of stare decisis in consti-
tutional cases. Some Court opinions hint at this. 40 And the argument has
38. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1922-
23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. The RICO statute, short for "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,"
is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. I continue to believe that Congress never intended the
private civil actions it created in RICO to be used to file ordinary fraud and breach of contract
claims against respected, legitimate businesses. See Sedirna, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479, 523-30 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989) (Scalia, 3.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas expressed similar views in a 1949 article in the Columbia Law
Review. He asserted that a Justice must remember "above all else that it is the Constitution
which he swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on
it." Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. Rav. 735, 736 (1949).
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been made directly by a former Assistant Attorney General in the Cornell
Law Review. 4' This view of stare decisis also has little to commend it.
Those who would eliminate stare decisis in constitutional cases argue
that the doctrine is simply one of convenience. 42 These critics say stare
decisis is useful only to judges who would defend their own erroneous
decisions against shifting majorities on the Court. It is true that stare decisis,
as applied, can be based on subjective standards that are unprincipled. It
is also true that stare decisis is cited far more often by dissenters when a
case has been overruled than by a Justice who relies on stare decisis to
uphold a case even though he or she thinks that the case was wrongly
decided. But the elimination of constitutional stare decisis would represent
an explicit endorsement of the idea that the Constitution is nothing more
than what five Justices say it is. This would undermine the rule of law.
E. Important Factors if Stare Decisis is to Work
Looking to the decades ahead, several conditions are important to the
future long term health of stare decisis. Speaking broadly, these conditions
all involve judicial restraint. This means recognition that the Court's func-
tion is to decide cases involving specific issues and particular parties. The
Court does not sit to make announcements of abstract principles or to give
advisory opinions. Unnecessary resolution of broad questions always raises
the stakes. It creates incentives for future attacks on the Court's opinions.
In each case the Court should focus specifically on the particular facts of
the case and the questions properly presented. Too often, Justices write
more broadly than necessary to decide the case before the Court. Law clerks
do not make the decisions, but they often add expansive footnotes that a
Justice may accept uncritically. In a subsequent case, the footnote will be
cited as the law.
Related aspects of judicial restraint that promote a modest model of
adjudication include attention to the rules of standing. The Court also
should hesitate to create new areas of judicial oversight, such as where the
Court is asked to infer private rights of action in statutes. 43 Deference to
41. See Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication,
73 CoRNmEr L. Rnv. 401 (1988).
42. See id. at 402.
43. Whether a particular private actor should have the right to a civil-court remedy for
violations of certain statutory rights is likely a matter of importance to many disparate groups
in our society. As such, the question should be resolved by our elected representatives, not by
"relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the political process." Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 731 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Even if Congress
wants to avoid the hard political choices involved in creating a new private right of action by
leaving this work to the courts, the judicial branch has a constitutional obligation to avoid
making such fundamentally legislative choices. Every time the courts "indulge Congress in its
refusal to confront these hard questions," we unwisely and unconstitutionally denigrate the
political process and the distinct nature of our tripartite system of government. Id. at 743
n.14, 746-47.
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bodies that may be more expert in a particular field, such as school boards
and the military, is also appropriate. 44 Intelligent use of certiorari jurisdiction
will allow the Court to avoid precipitous judgments in new areas of the
law that the Court later may regret.
I also mention the frequency of separate writings and splintered opi-
nions. Last term, the Court decided eighteen cases-over ten percent of its
entire merits docket-without an opinion joined by a majority of the Court.
Although I have written my share of separate opinions, in hindsight I would
urge the Court to look carefully at the effects of this practice on respect
for the Court as an institution. Splintered decisions provide insufficient
guidance for lower courts. They may promote disrespect for the Court as
a whole and more emphasis on "vote counting." Failure of the Court to
settle on a rationale for a decision invites perpetual attack and reexamina-
tion. The Justices "have an institutional responsibility not only to respect
stare decisis, but also to make every reasonable effort to harmonize [their]
views on constitutional questions of broad practical application. '45
CONCLUSION
It is evident that I consider stare decisis essential to the rule of law.
This is readily understood with respect to business and economic issues,
and to the Court's interpretation of statutes on which parties rely in planning
their conduct. As I have noted, the doctrine applies with less force when
new Justices confront the interpretation of the Constitution. Yet, even here,
there is a body of constitutional decisions and principles that merits respect.
Much of the language of the Constitution, particularly the provisions of
the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, require interpretation.
After two centuries of vast change, the original intent of the Founders is
difficult to discern or is irrelevant. Indeed, there may be no evidence of
intent. The Framers of the Constitution were wise enough to write broadly,
using language that must be construed in light of changing conditions that
could not be foreseen. Yet the doctrine of stare decisis has remained a
constant thread in preserving continuity and stability.
I emphasize that the views which I have expressed are not intended as
either praise or criticism of particular cases. The point that I hope to make
is a broader one. History shows that change is inevitable. The first airplane
flew less than four years before I was born. Today spacecrafts are com-
monplace. Voyager II, launched in 1977, sent back in August 1989 important
scientific information about Neptune." The inevitability of change touches
law as it does every aspect of life. But stability and moderation are uniquely
important to the law. In the long run, restraint in decisionmaking and
44. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 893-94 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
45. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 436 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment).
46. See Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
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respect for decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an inde-
pendent judiciary and public respect for the judiciary's role as a guardian
of rights.
It is sad that my friend Leslie Arps is not with us here today. Perhaps
I presume that he would agree with much if not all of what I have said.
His service to the law and the professionalism of the bar was distinguished.
I am grateful for the opportunity to make the first Leslie Arps Lecture.
LEwis F. POWELL, JR.
October 17, 1989
